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ABSTRACT 
This research work analyzes the universal 
mobile telecommunication system (UMTS) 
authentication and key agreement (AKA) 
protocol, which suffers from the traffic 
bottleneck at home location register and 
authentication center (HLR/AuC). In addition, 
serving network has no capability to 
authenticate mobile station. To overcome these 
problems a new security scheme has been 
proposed which provides a more efficient and a 
secure authentication between mobile station 
and home networks, the proposed protocol 
called Efficient AKA (E-AKA). 
The E-AKA uses a temporary key to enable 
visitor location register and serving network 
(VLR/SN) to authenticate mobile station (MS) 
without intervention of HLR/AuC. To analyze 
and validate the security of the proposed 
protocol, the BAN (Burrows, Abadi and 
Needham) logic is used. The results show that 
the E-AKA protocol is more robust than the 
current AKA protocol.  
Keywords: 3G, Authentication, Security, 
Mobile Station, and BAN. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Authentication is used to provide security 
services in wireless mobile networks, it is 
considered as an initial process to authorize a 
mobile terminal for communication through 
secret credentials [1]. The authentication 
process provides a reasonable level of security, 
but it overloads the network with significant 
signalling traffic and increases the call setup 
time [1].  
The current mechanism for security 
authentication in 3G system is known as AKA 
protocol. In this mechanism a secret key (K), 
and cryptographic algorithms are shared 
between MS and HN [1, 2]. The AKA protocol 
has many weaknesses such as, the transmission 
between the HN and SN is usually expensive, 
the authentication vectors (AVs) consume 
network bandwidth for each transmission from 
authentication centre to SN [3], the storage 
space overhead occurs in SN, and bottleneck at 
HN, the HN is responsible for generating 
authentication vectors upon receipt of requests 
from all SN.  
Responding to the weakness mentioned above, 
by referring to the current authentication 
method and improving the proposed scheme, 
this research work proposes a novel efficient 
and secure authentication scheme. Furthermore, 
the objective and security of the proposed 
scheme are analyzed by the formal analytical 
process of the BAN logic. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
illustrates the UMTS AKA. The literature 
review is presented in section 3. In section 4, 
the efficient and secure AKA scheme is 
described. Formal analysis for the proposed 
scheme by using BAN logic is introduced in 
section 5. The paper is concluded in Section 6. 
2. UMTS AKA PROTOCOL 
In AKA protocol, each MS shares secret key 
(K), and cryptographic algorithms - include 
three message authentication codes f1, f1*and f2
and four key generation functions f3, f4, f5 and 
f5*- with its HN [1, 4].  
The goals of the UMTS AKA protocol are, a 
mutual authentication between user and the 
network; an establishment of a cipher key and 
an integrity key; and established cipher and 
integrity keys [1, 4].  
There are two phases in AKA protocol, the first 
phase is the generation and distribution 
authentication vectors from the HN to the SN, 
and the second phase is the authentication and 
key agreement procedure between the MS and 
the SN [2, 5]. An overview of UMTS AKA is 
shown in figure 1 [6]. 
Mobile station (MS) sends authentication 
request to the SN, which includes International 
Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI). SN passes 
this authentication request to HN. HN sends 
authentication data response to SN, which 
include authentication vector (AV). Each 
authentication vector has five components: 
random number (RAND), expected response 
(XRES), cipher key (CK), integrity key (IK) 
and authentication token (AUTN). The 
authentication vectors are ordered by the 
sequence number SQNHLR. The authentication 
vector is generated according to the following 
steps [6, 7]: 
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i. HN set SQN to SQNHN and generates 
RAND.
ii. HN computes the following values: 
XRES, CK, IK, AK, and MAC  
iii. HN assembles the authentication token 
AUTN = (SQN ⊕ AK||AMF||MAC) 
and the authentication vector 
(RAND,XRES, CK, IK, AUTN)
iv. HN increments SQNHLR by 1.
SN is receiving response from HN and then 
storing AV. The SN selects the ith authentication 
vector AV(i), and sends (RAND (i), AUTN(i)) 
to MS. Each authentication vector is efficient 
for one authentication process [6]. 
MS is receiving RAND and AUTN from SN. 
MS computes and retrieves the anonymity key 
AK, SQN, expected message authentication 
code XMAC. The MS compares XMAC with 
MAC which is included in AUTN. If they are 
different, then MS sends failure message to the 
SN. Otherwise, MS checks that the received 
SQN is in the correct range. If the SQN is not in 
the correct range, then MS sends failure 
message to the SN. Otherwise, if the SQN in 
correct range, the MS computes RES and sends 
it to SN. Lately, MS computes CK and IK.
SN is receiving authentication response from 
MS. SN compares the received RES with 
XRES in authentication vector.  If RES is 
matching XRES, then authentications is 
successfully completed and select the CK and 
IK from authentication vector. If RES is 
unequal XRES, SN sends authentication failure 
to the HN. 
3. RELATED WORK 
The UMTS AKA protocol has the problem of 
the bandwidth consumption between SN and 
HN. It is attractive to choose a suitable length 
(L) value for AV in the third generation mobile 
networks. So, many techniques are developed to 
minimize the authentication signalling cost and 
network bandwidth consumption by selecting 
dynamic length (L) for an authentication vector 
[1, 5, 6, and 8]. But with this improvement by 
[5, 9] there are still a bandwidth consumption 
[6]. 
The technique of Lin and Chen basically 
estimated the number of authentication requests 
in current visited network based on the number 
in the previous visited network. Whereas the 
method of AL-Saraireh and Yousef, estimated 
the number of authentication requests in current 
visited network based on the history of mobile 
movements and the arrival rate for events [5]. 
Juang and Wu proposed an efficient 3GPP 
AKA with robust user privacy. A temporary 
key to authenticate MS and prevent the location 
privacy attack is used. In this proposed 
protocol, the VLR initiates the authentication 
process by sending a random number to the MS
without using any MAC. [10] Therefore denial 
of services (DoS) attack is possible. 
Additionally, the proposed protocol has seven 
steps. 
A new UMTS AKA protocol called EAKAP is 
proposed in [11]. The EAKAP combines 
identification stage and AKA stage of UMTS 
AKA protocol. The problem in EAKAP is that 
the size of messages between MS, VLR/SGSN
and HLR/AuC is increased. Therefore; the 
consumption of bandwidth is occurred. 
Subscriber identity/location confidential and 
non-repudiation services are solved by [12], the 
proposed scheme integrates symmetric and 
public key cryptosystem. An Enhancement for 
UMTS AKA protocol is proposed by Harn and 
Hsin used hash chaining technique instead of 
using AVs [9].  
4. THE EFFICENT SCHEME E-AKA
PROTOCOL 
E-AKA is used to eliminate the security 
weakness involved with UMTS AKA.  E-AKA 
is considered as a secure and an efficient 
authentication scheme. In the E-AKA scheme 
VLR/SN has the capability to authenticate the 
user without intervention of HLR/HN.  
The E-AKA uses a new key generation 
functions called fx to generate the temporary 
key (TK). The fx function produces a 128 bits or 
higher bits to provide high level of security.  In 
the proposed protocol, the SN is able to 
authenticate the MS after the initial 
authentication has been performed. The 
proposed authentication protocol contains two 
operation modes for initial and subsequent 
authentication. The first mode is registration 
and distribution of authentication information 
(Initial Authentication) and temporary key (TK) 
from the HLR/HN to the VLR/SN. The second 
mode is the authentication and key agreement 
procedure (Subsequent authentication) 
performed between the MS and the VLR/SN. 
Figure 2 and 3 describe authentication 
mechanism for the proposed protocol. The 
authentication procedure is described as follow: 
Step 1: Authentication Request Message: 
When MS needs authentication to network, 
to access or use to use the network services, 
the initial authentication is carried out as 
follow:   
1.1 MS generates random number 
(RandMS),  
1.2 MS computes the Message 
Authentication Code MACMS= f1(K, 
RandMS), 
1.3 MS sends IMS, RandMS and MACMS
as authentication request to VLR/SN. 
Step 2: Authentication Request Message: 
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VLR/SN passes this authentication request 
to HLR/HN.  
Step 3: Authentication Response Message: 
Receiving the authentication request and 
then verification procedure is performed by 
HLR/HN. A response message is generated. 
The following operations are carried by 
HLR/HN: 
3.1  Compares and computes expected 
message authentication code for mobile 
station (XMACMS) to verify the 
received message.  
XMACMS=f1(K, RandMS) 
XMACMS ?= MACMs
If mismatching occurs then the registration 
will fail otherwise it will execute the next 
steps. 
3.2 Generates SQNHLR and RANDHLR.
3.3 Computes expected response XRESHLR
= f2(K,RANDHLR), Anonymity Key 
AKHLR = f5(K,RANDHLR), Message 
Authentication Code MACHLR = 
f1(K,SQN||RANDHLR||MAF), where
MAF is Message Authentication Field 
and authentication token AUTNHLR = 
(SQN ⊕ AKHLR||AMF||MACHLR) where 
⊕  is exclusive OR operation.
3.4 Computes temporary key TK = 
fx(K,RANDHLR). 
3.5 Sets response messages and sends it to 
VLR/SGSN, including one 
authentication vector AV. This AV
consists of four components: 
RANDHLR, XRESHLR, TK and 
AUTNHLR. 
AV = RANDHLR|| XRESHLR||TK|| AUTNHLR 
Step 4: Authentication Response Message: 
Receiving the response message from 
HLR/HN, VLR/SN will invoke the 
authentication to the MS. VLR/SN will 
achieve the following: 
4.1 Stores the TK, AUTNHLR and generates 
RandVLR.
4.2 Computes MACVLR=f1(TK, 
MACHLR||RandVLR) where the MACHLR
retrieved from AUTNHLR which stored 
in previous step. 
4.3 Computes AUTNVLR = (SQNHLR
⊕ AKHLR||AMF||MACVLR) 
4.4 VLR/SN sends AUTHVLR, RandVLR and 
RandHLR to MS
Step 5: Authentication Response Message: 
When MS receives the messages, the MS
will achive the following: 
5.1 Computes TK=fx(K, RandHLR). 
5.2 Verifies that the received sequence 
number SQN is in the correct range. If 
the MS considers the sequence number 
to be not in the correct range, it sends 
synchronization failure back to the 
VLR/SN including an appropriate 
parameter, and abandons the procedure. 
5.3 Computes XMAC for HLR and VLR.
 XMACHLR = f1(K, AKMS ⊕  (SQNHLR
⊕ AKHLR)||RandHLR|| AMF)  where 
RandHLR and AMF are retrieved from 
AUTNVLR 
XMACVLR = 
f1(TK,XMACHLR||RandVLR). 
If XMACVLR is equal XMACVLR then 
HLR/HN and VLR/SN are valid,  
5.4 Computes an XRES = f2(TK, RandVLR)
5.5 Sends XRES to VLR/SN. While, the 
MS computes an integrity key as IK = 
f3(TK, RandVLR) and a cipher key as CK 
= f4(TK, RandVLR) to realize securely 
communication with VLR/SN
subsequently. 
Step 6: Authentication Response Message: 
VLR/SN receives the messages from MS
and verifies whether RES is identical to the 
XRES. If it is true, the whole authentication 
is successfully completed. If it is false, the 
authentication is failed. 
After the initial authentication, both the 
VLR/SN and MS obtain the authentication 
result from the HLR/HN and share some secret 
information. Here, the VLR/SN caches some 
authentication information, which can be used 
in subsequent authentication without 
intervention of HLR/HN. 
After initial authentication, the VLR/SN has the 
ability to authenticate the MS in subsequent 
authentication. If the MS remains in the same 
VLR/SN and requests services, then the user 
should ask for subsequent authentication. MS
similarly generates an authentication request 
message, which should contain the information 
shared between the MS and VLR/SN; the 
VLR/SN uses this information to authenticate 
the MS. VLR/SN authenticates MS by using 
temporary key TK. 
As mentioned above, the VLR/SN has cached 
information needed to authenticate MS. After 
authenticating the MS, the VLR/SN sends a 
response message containing the authentication 
result to the MS. The MS receives the response 
message and learns whether the authentication 
was successful or not. The subsequent 
authentication is described as follows: 
Step 1: Authentication Request Message 
MS sends authentication request to VLR/SN
Step 2: Authentication Request Message 
When VLR/SN receives the request 
message, VLR/SN will do the following: 
2.1 Generates RandVLR
2.2 Computes authenticate token AUTN  = 
SQN ⊕  AK ||AMF ||MAC 
Where AK = f5(TK,RAND), and  MAC 
= f1(TK,SQN||RAND||MAF). 
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2.3 Sends AUTN and RAND to MS. 
Step 3: Authentication Response Message 
When MS receives the response message,
MS will achieve the following: 
3.1 Computes and retrieves the  AK = f5
(TK, Rand),  SQN =( (SQN ⊕  AK) 
⊕  AK),  and  XMAC = f1 (SQN, 
RAND, AMF)  
3.2 Compares XMAC with MAC which is 
included in AUTN. If XMAC is not 
equal to MAC then MS sends failure 
message to the VLR/SN, else if XMAC
is equal MAC then MS checks that the 
received SQN is in the correct range i.e. 
SQN > SQNMS. If SQN is not in the 
correct range then MS sends failure 
message to the VLR/SN, else if it is in 
the correct range, then MS computes 
the Response RES = f2 (TK, RAND), 
and CK = f3 (TK, Rand). After that, it 
sends RES to VLR/SN. 
Step 4: Authentication Response Message 
VLR/SN receives the messages from MS
and verifies whether RES is identical to the 
XRES. If it is true, the whole authentication 
is successfully completed. If it is false, the 
authentication is failed. 
5. FORMAL ANALYSIS OF E-AKA 
BAN logic represents a powerful tool to 
describe and validate authentication protocols. 
In this research work BAN logic is used to 
formalize and prove the security of the 
proposed protocol. BAN Logic [13] is a formal 
method for verifying that two principles (MS, 
VLR/SN, HN/HLR) are entitled to believe they 
are communicating with each other. It is based 
on an agreed set of deduction rules for formally 
reasoning about the authentication protocols 
and is often referred to as logic of 
authentication [7, 13, and 14]. 
5.1. BAN LOGIC NOTATION AND
DEDUCTION RULES 
The definitions of BAN logic and their 
implications are presented below (P and Q are 
network agents, X is a message, and K is an 
encryption key) [7, 13, and 14]: 
- :| XP ≡ Denotes that P believes X. P
may act as though X is true. 
- :XP < Denotes that P sees X. 
Someone has sent P a message 
containing X. P can read X and can 
repeat it in other messages. 
- :)(# X Denotes that X is fresh. X has 
not been sent in a message at any time 
before the current run of the protocol. 
- :XP⇒ Denotes that P control X; P
has jurisdiction over X. P is a trusted 
authority on the truth of X. 
- :|~ XP Denotes that P said X. At 
one time, P transmitted (and believed) 
message X, although P might no longer 
believe X.  
- :|~|/),(|~| XQPYXQP ≡≡
- :QP K⎯→← Denotes that K is a 
good shared key for communication 
between P and Q, and it will never be 
discovered by any principal except for 
P or Q. 
- :P
K
a Denotes that K is the public 
key of P.  
- :}{ KX Denotes that X is encrypted 
with key K.  
- :Q
P
Means if P is true then Q is true.  
Some deduction rules that are used in 
the analysis of proposed scheme are 
described as follow [7, 14, and 15]: 
- Message meaning rules: this rule 
concerns the interpretation of 
messages. This rule helps to explain 
the origin of the messages. For shared 
keys:
XQP
XPQPP KK
|~|
}{,|
≡
⎯→←≡ <
- Nonce verification rules: this rule 
checks that a message is recent, and 
also checks if the sender still believes 
in it.
XQP
XQPXP
≡≡
≡≡
||
|~|),(#|
- Jurisdiction rules: This rule states 
what it means for a principal to be the 
trusted authority on the truth of X. 
XP
XQPXQP
≡
≡≡⇒≡
|
||,||
- Seeing rules: This rule says that a 
principal sees all the components of 
every message it sees, provided that 
the principal knows the necessary key 
)(
),(
XP
YXP
<
<
XP
XPQPP KK
<
< }{,| ⎯→←≡
- Belief rules: The rule states that a 
principal believes a collection of 
statements if and only if it believes 
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each of the statements individually. 
)(|
),(|
XP
YXP
≡
≡
The following steps of BAN logic has been 
used to analyze the proposed protocol:  
i. The proposed protocol is transformed 
into idealized form 
ii. Identify our initial assumptions in the 
language of BAN logic 
iii. Use the postulates and rules of the 
logic to deduce new predicates 
iv. Interpret the proved statements by the 
process? Have the goals met?  
5.2. SECURITY PROOF 
By using the notation and deduction rules in 
section 5.1, the protocol security can be proved.  
The original version of the proposed scheme 
without idealization form is as following: 
Message 1 
MSMS MACRandIMSISNVLRMS ,,:/→
Message 2 
MSMS MACRandIMSIHNHLRSNVLR ,,:// →
Message 3 
HLRHL
HLR
AUTHTKRXRES
RandSNVLRHNHLR
,,
,:// →
Message 4 
VLRHLRVLR AUTHRandRandMSSNVLR ,,:/ →
Step 1: Idealized Form: The ideal form of 
protocol using BAN logic is: 
),,(/ MSMs MACRandIMSIHNHLR <
),,,(/ HLRHLRHLR AUTHTKXRESRandSNVLR <
),,( VLRHLRVLR AUTHRandRandMS <
Step 2: Initial Hypothetical: The initial 
supposition on the protocol as follows: 
HNHLRMS K /⎯→←
The temporary key is used in proposed E-AKA 
protocol to reduce the traffic between 
HLR/AuC and 
Step 3: Final Goal Set: 
)2........(..................../|
)1........(..................../|
GSNVLRMSMS
GHNHLRMSMS
TK
K
⎯→⎯≡
⎯→←≡
Step 4: Form Analysis of Proposed Protocol: 
According to initial assumption 
HNHLRMS K /⎯→← and message meaning 
rule 
XQP
XPQPP KK
|~|
}{,|
≡
⎯→←≡ <
, it can 
be deduced the first goal as follows: 
HLRXMACHNHLRMS |~/|≡ , Use 
HLRMS XMACMAC = to obtain the following 
HNHLRMSMS K /| ⎯→←≡ which is the 
first  goal (G1) 
To deduce the second goal (G2): 
SNVLRMS TK /| ⎯→⎯≡ . By using the 
following three rules 
1. First goal 
HNHLRMSMS K /| ⎯→←≡  and  
2. Seeing  rule:  
XP
XPQPP KK
<
< }{,| ⎯→←≡
 and 
3. Jurisdiction rule:  
XP
XQPXQP
≡
≡≡⇒≡
|
||,||
  
to obtain  
SNVLRMS VLRXMC /| ⎯⎯ →⎯< , use 
VLRMACSNVLRMS |~/|≡ and
VLRVLR XMACMAC =  to obtain the 
following: SNVLRMS TK /| ⎯→⎯≡
which is the second goal (G2). 
According to the given analysis, the 
proposed protocol can be considered 
secure. 
5. CONCLUSION 
In this research work, the current UMTS 
authentication and key agreement protocol have 
been analyzed, and showed that it has set of 
weaknesses. The new authentication scheme 
provides a solution for these weaknesses. The 
proposed protocol provides a mutual 
authentication between mobile station and its 
home network and serving network. The 
signalling traffic is reduced between home 
network and serving network by using 
temporary key. The serving network has 
capabilities to authenticate mobile station 
without intervention from home network. The 
proposed protocol has been improved and 
formalized by using BAN logic. 
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Figure 1: The Authentications and key agreement protocol.
Figure 2 Registration and distribution of authentication information (Initial Authentication) in EAKA 
Figure 3 Subsequent authentications in EAKA 
MS VLR/SN HLR/HN 
User Authentication Response (RES) 
TIMSI 
Compute AK 
Compare MAC ?= XMAC 
Compare SEQ with SEQMS
Compute RES, CK, IK
Compare RES ?= XRES
Generates RandVLR
MAC=f1(TK,SQN||RAND||MAF) 
AUTN = (SQN ⊕  AK||AMF||MAC) 
AK=f5(TK,Rand) 
AUTN, RAND 
MS VLR/SN HLR/HN 
Authentication & Key Establishment 
Initail Authentication and Create Temporary Key IMSI, RandMS, MACMS
IMSI, RandMS, MACMS
User Authentication Response (RES) 
Authentication Data Response 
AV=(RandHLR||XRESHLR||TK||AUTNHLR) 
Store TK, AUTNHLR, compute MACVLR=f1(TK, MACHLR||RandVLR) 
AUTNVLR = (SQNHLR ⊕ AKHLR||AMF||MACVLR) 
Authentication Data Response 
AUTNVLR, RandVLR, RandHLR
Compare RES ?= XRES 
HE/HLRVLR/SGSNMS
1. Authentication Data Request (IMSI)
Distribution of Authentication
Authentication & Key
3. User Authentication Request (RANDi,
2. Authentication Data Response
4. User Authentication Response (RES)
XMACMS ?= MACMS
XRESHLR = f2(K,RANDHLR)
TK=fx(K,RandHLR), AKHLR=f5(K,RandHLR) 
MACHLR=(K, SQN||RandHLR||MAF) 
AUTNHLR = (SQN ⊕  AKHLR||AMF||MACHLR)
XMACHLR ?= MACHLR 
XMACVLR ?= MACVLR 
XRES=f2(TK,RandVLR) 
TK=fx(K,RandHLR) 
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